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Abstract
Spammers are continually looking to circumvent counter-measures seeking to slow
them down. An immense amount of time and money is currently devoted to hid-
ing spam, but not enough is devoted to effectively preventing it. One approach
for preventing spam is to force the spammer’s machine to solve a computational
problem of varying difficulty before granting access. The idea is that suspicious or
problematic requests are given difficult problems to solve while legitimate requests
are allowed through with minimal computation. Unfortunately, most systems that
employ this model waste the computing resources being used, as they are directed
towards solving cryptographic problems that provide no societal benefit. While sys-
tems such as reCAPTCHA and FoldIt have allowed users to contribute solutions
to useful problems interactively, an analogous solution for non-interactive proof-
of-work does not exist. Towards this end, this paper describes MetaCAPTCHA
and reBOINC, an infrastructure for supporting useful proof-of-work that is inte-
grated into a web spam throttling service. The infrastructure dynamically issues
CAPTCHAs and proof-of-work puzzles while ensuring that malicious users solve
challenging puzzles. Additionally, it provides a framework that enables the compu-
tational resources of spammers to be redirected towards meaningful research. To
validate the efficacy of our approach, prototype implementations based on OpenCV
and BOINC are described that demonstrate the ability to harvest spammer’s re-
sources for beneficial purposes.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Internet spammers are relentless. Although email spam is reducing (from 92.2%
in Aug 2010 to ≈ 70.5% in Jan 2012 ), the spam on social networking sites is edg-
ing up [49]. In 2011, approximately 4 million Facebook users received spam from
around 600,000 new or hijacked accounts each day [49, 71]. From there on, social
spam had risen 355% just during the first six months of 2013 [109]. Particularly,
the success rates of social spam are frightening: 0.13% of all spam URLs on Twit-
ter were visited by around 1.6 million unsuspecting users [55]. This click-through
rate is significantly higher than the ones of email spam which were reported at
0.003% - 0.006% [64]. Especially on Facebook, the mean spam conversion rate was
a staggering number of 47% [86]. This means that nearly half the Facebook users
who saw spam links or messages actually clicked on and read them. Furthermore,
traditional web applications such as blogs, e-commerce and forums are also suffer-
ing from the increased amount of social spam. With the expanding popularity of
OAuth protocol1, it is very common for web applications to be tightly integrated
with social network ecosystems. While this is convenient for the users, a compro-
mised account in a social networking site can spam not only the account’s friends,
but every web application using the OAuth features of the networking site. As
1The OAuth - Open Authentication - protocol allows the same user account to be used in
multiple websites. For example, a Wordpress blog that implements Facebook’s OAuth protocol
will allow anonymous users to use their Facebook’s accounts to post comments.
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a result, social networking sites and web applications in general have become the
new attractive venue for Internet spammers.
1.1 CURRENT ANTI-SPAM STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES
Current methods for fighting spam in web applications can be classified in two
strategies: detection-based and prevention-based [59]. The detection-based meth-
ods classify a given data as spam or ham (not spam messages) whereas the prevention-
based ones make it difficult to send spam. A spam filter is a famous example of
detection-based methods. Spam filters work by employing various machine learning
algorithms and statistical techniques to discard malicious content while leaving un-
malicious data intact. By training the spam filters on a known set of large enough
spam and ham, the filters can determine how likely a new data is spam or ham
with up to 99.9% accuracy [108].
One drawback of spam detection methods is that they identify the malicious
contents only after the contents have been transported. For instance, a bot using
a hijacked account on Facebook to send spam to all of its friends only gets caught
after the messages have been transported through the network and arrived at
Facebook’s servers. Moreover, spam detection methods don’t punish malicious
behaviors enough; they only hide the malicious contents away from the legitimate
ones. Thus, a spam bot could use a strategy to attack many web applications for as
long as its resources are available. Since any statistical spam detection algorithm
will have a small false positive rate (known as Bayes error rate [38]), the strategy
will maximize the amount of malicious contents that gets to the web applications
undetected. As such, the Internet is clogged with endless spam traffic requiring
demanding computing resources to filter. To prevent this deluge traffic of spam,
several spam prevention methods are often employed, among them, CAPTCHA
and proof-of-work are two most common methods [59].
CAPTCHAs are special tests designed to tell computers and humans apart.
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The common types of CAPTCHAs usually use distorted texts and images that are
hard for computers but easy for humans to solve. However, a CAPTCHA can ef-
fectively protect an online transaction so long as there aren’t OCR algorithms that
can automatically “solve” or “break” it [92]. On average, an algorithm to break
CAPTCHAs only needs to have a precision rate as low as %1 to be considered suc-
cessful [26]. Once a class of CAPTCHAs is broken, the corresponding application
becomes defenseless against spam bots. In addition, CAPTCHAs are also prone
to outsourcing attacks where humans are used to solve CAPTCHAs en masse. A
major cause of success for these attacks is that CAPTCHAs don’t provide a way
to change the cost of solving them [76, 77]. Plus, the usability burden imposed by
CAPTCHAs [106] limits their use to only protecting infrequent transactions like
creating accounts. This leaves frequent transactions, like message posting, open
to abuse. Attackers exploit this loophole by hijacking accounts and using them to
send spam.
Proof-of-work is a different kind of spam prevention method that does not have
CAPTCHA’s usability issues and therefore, can be used in frequent transactions.
Proof-of-work often involves cryptographic algorithms whose results are challeng-
ing to find but easy to be verified. An application using the proof-of-work protocol
will require user’s devices to compute these algorithms as “work“. The applica-
tion’s servers will verify the outcomes of this work in order to grant users access to
certain services. This work will not require any user intervention which removes the
usability burdens of CAPTCHAs; however, the users will need to wait for a small
period of time in order to have their devices completing the work. On the other
hand, spammers will have to solve an increased amount of work corresponding to
the excessive amount of spam they sent. Furthermore, this paradigm enables an
application to price a transaction by varying the amount of work that needs to be
done as payment. In fact, proof-of-work systems are only effective if the price of
the transaction is based on the corresponding user’s reputation [67]. Such systems
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limit the number of spam messages an attacker can send by arbitrarily increasing
the resource cost for accepting the requests.
However, while the principle of proof-of-work seems effective in increasing the
cost of spam, existing systems of this kind have two main shortcomings. First,
the computing resources that the user’s devices spent in solving the proof-of-work
are wasted. Most of the proposed systems do not employ a useful computation
(a computation whose result can be reused for other purposes such as volunteer
computing) as a proof-of-work. It is crucial to note that while consuming some
computational resources of the devices is required by the proof-of-work protocol,
abandoning the results of those computations is undesirable. As a result, the proof-
of-work protocol solves one problem by increasing the cost of spam, but creates
another problem by wasting the user’s computing power. The second shortcoming
of current systems is the impracticality in constructing, supporting and deploy-
ing proof-of-work. Many proposed systems [42, 23, 60, 39, 62, 110] (i) demand
changes of the network layer or the application layer to allow the proof-of-work
protocol to operate, (ii) use only cryptographic functions to generate and verify
the proof-of-work, and (iii) restrict the proof-of-work functions to a limited class of
computations. Thus, creating a new proof-of-work for the former systems requires
numerous conditions to be met, thereby, making it complicated to create.
1.2 DESIGN GOALS
Motivated by the above observations, we want our fighting spam systems to retain
the strengths of CAPTCHAs and proof-of-work while addressing their weaknesses.
For instance our systems undertake current drawbacks of CAPTCHAs such as no
support to price a transaction dynamically based on user’s reputations, no backup
solution when one class of CAPTCHAs is broken and most importantly the usabil-
ity issues imposed by CAPTCHAs. Likewise, the systems tackle existing problems
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of the proof-of-work model such as no support for big classes of computation, wast-
ing computing cycles of the user’s devices for meaningless cryptographic functions
with no reusable results. Furthermore, we believe that a successful security model
should create a more pleasant user’s experience as well as protect a system against
improper behaviors. Ultimately, the systems should be flexible, practical and se-
cure that the community can adopt to solve real-world problems. Thus we setup
the following requirements for our systems as design goals:
Flexibility New systems or modifications are easy to be added with relatively
less effort than creating them from scratch. The systems can work with many
existing web applications with little extra overheads.
Practicality The systems are concerned with current usability and impractica-
bility issues and use well-known standards to solve those issues. The systems are
fast and efficient with acceptable latency for web transactions such as message
postings and account creations.
Security The systems are difficult for the adversaries to subvert. The systems
are dynamic and adaptable to new adversarial tactics while ensuring that legitimate
users are not encumbered.
1.3 OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We designed and implemented the MetaCAPTCHA and reBOINC systems. Meta-
CAPTCHA is an application-agnostic spam prevention service for the web. Meta-
CAPTCHA adds metamorphism to address CAPTCHA’s usability, strengthens
proof-of-work’s flexibility and security while augmenting each. reBOINC lever-
ages MetaCAPTCHA’s infrastructures and improves the proof-of-work model to
support a green, flexible and practical computing model. The reBOINC system
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is designed to be a computational analogy to reCAPTCHA [101] - an anti-spam
system where half of the work being done goes towards digitizing text in scanned
books. As a result, computing resources spent for solving proof-of-work in the
reBOINC system directly benefit volunteer computing projects.
More specifically the MetaCAPTCHA and reBOINC systems:
• Seamlessly integrate the CAPTCHA and proof-of-work approaches. They
can dynamically issue proof-of-work or CAPTCHA puzzles while ensuring
that malicious users solve much “harder” puzzles — CAPTCHAs included
— than honest users.
• Support a variety of computations, as well as workloads from BOINC (The
Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing) [18, 11] - the most
widely adopted infrastructure for volunteer computing projects - as proof-of-
work. Therefore, the systems are not only green but also practical (require
little changes and support big classes of computations).
• Connect the pool of computing resources at the spammer’s disposal to the
large quantity of research projects that require computational resources. By
doing so, a win-win scenario is accomplished in that either a significant
amount of useful work is completed, or a considerable reduction in spam
is achieved.
• Randomly pick and deliver puzzles within a generic solver that eventually
executes those puzzles in the user’s web browser. Thus, the solver code
is metamorphic where it is changing randomly in each transaction. This
turns the reverse engineering problem around on the adversary who must
now attach a debugger to discover the solver’s execution steps.
• Use a Bayesian reputation service that can accurately predict a user’s rep-
utation score based on features configured by the web application. Since
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multiple web applications can be protected by our systems, the reputation
service provides global visibility on attacks across all those applications.
• Contain a modular puzzle library that can be configured with new types of
CAPTCHAs or proof-of-work puzzles while allowing the removal of those
types that are known to be “broken”. These puzzle library modifications
can be made by the web application without any change to its source code.
Furthermore, the variety of puzzles in the library ensures that breaking one
class of puzzles won’t compromise the systems as a whole.
The remainder of the paper is sectioned as follows. Chapter 2 describes the
design, implementation and evaluation of MetaCAPTCHA and lays the foundation
for the reBOINC system. Next, chapter 3 details the design, implementation and
evaluation of reBOINC. The reBOINC system is the main contribution of this
paper where spammer computing resources are harvested to use for good purposes.
Chapter 4 outlines related work and Chapter 5 concludes this paper.
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2
METAMORPHIC PROOF-OF-WORK IN ONLINE APPLICATIONS
Spam is a problem that refuses to go away. An immense amount of time and money
is currently devoted to hiding spam, but not enough is devoted to effectively pre-
venting it. CAPTCHAs are a prevalent spam prevention mechanism, but are get-
ting harder for humans to solve and easier for programs to “break”. CAPTCHAs
also cannot prevent spam from hijacked accounts since they are mostly used dur-
ing account creation. In addition, CAPTCHAs doesn’t have a dynamic pricing
function where the difficulty of solving the CAPTCHAs can be controlled. Proof-
of-work approaches are gaining popularity, but current implementations are not ef-
fective enough and cannot be used by generic web applications. Towards this end,
this chapter presents MetaCAPTCHA, an application-agnostic spam prevention
service for web applications. It dynamically issues CAPTCHAs and proof-of-work
puzzles while ensuring that malicious users solve challenging puzzles with exponen-
tial growth. Furthermore, MetaCAPTCHA strengthens the proof-of-work model
by using metamorphic puzzle issuing and solving process. This metamorphic pro-
cess ensures that the adversaries wanting to attack MetaCAPTCHA will have to
continuously solve the reverse-engineering problem. We evaluate MetaCAPTCHA
in the context of a reference web application and show that 95% of honest users
hardly notice MetaCAPTCHA’s presence, whereas the remaining 5% are required
to solve very “easy” puzzles before accessing the application’s services.
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2.1 BACKGROUND
MetaCAPTCHA dynamically issues CAPTCHA and proof-of-work puzzles. We
now provide a brief background on each kind of puzzle.
2.1.1 CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA stands for “Completely Automated Public Turing-test to tell Comput-
ers and Humans Apart”. CAPTCHAs usually consist of images containing squiggly
characters that are easy for humans to read, but hard for programs to parse. The
idea is to allow humans to access the web application’s services while deterring
automated adversaries like bots. A popular implementation of the CAPTCHA is
the reCAPTCHA [101].
2.1.2 Proof-of-work
The proof-of-work model was first proposed by Dwork and Naor [42] to combat
email spam. The idea was to impose a per-email cost on senders, where, the cost
was in terms of computational resources devoted by the sender to compute the
pricing function. Once a sender proved that it correctly computed the pricing
function, the server would send the email. Effectively, sending bulk spam would
become “expensive” because computational resources are finite. The characteris-
tics of such a pricing function f was then described as follows:
1. “moderately” easy to compute
2. not amenable to amortization: given any l values m1, . . . ,ml, the cost of
computing f(mi) is similar to the cost of computing f(mj) where i 6= j. In
other words, no amount of pre-processing should make it easier to compute
f on any input.
3. Given x and y, it is easy to check if y = f(x)
10
An example of a pricing function is one that finds partial hash collisions [22]. A
function fk : x → y is said to compute a k-bit partial hash collision on string x,
if given a hash function H, the first k bits of H(x) are equal to the first k bits of
H(y). Notice that fk(·) has all the properties required of a pricing function.
Although the proof-of-work approach seemed promising, Laurie and Clayton
[67] demonstrated in 2004 that reducing spam to 1% of normal email would require
delaying each message — including one that an honest user sends — by ≈ 6
minutes; a high price to pay for innocent users. This delay was computed based
on then current rates of spam, number of email users, and under the assumption
that 1 million compromised machines were spewing spam. Since then, spam has
increased by 18% to 74.2%, so we expect the aforementioned delay to be much
larger now.
To reduce this delay, Liu and Camp [68] proposed basing puzzle difficulties on
user reputation. The idea was that users with lower reputations would receive
harder puzzles than those with higher reputations. Since easier puzzles would be
much quicker to solve, honest users would experience a nominal delay when sending
messages where as malicious users may be significantly delayed. Thus, with an
accurate reputation system, the proof-of-work approach can be a practical, fair,
and effective technique for combating spam.
2.2 SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes the system model in which MetaCAPTCHA is applicable.
In general, interactive web applications where online transactions can be exploited
by spammers, such as message forums, webmail, social applications, and event-
ticket purchasing can employ MetaCAPTCHA for spam prevention. Heymann et
al. [59] provide an exhaustive discussion on the common characteristics of such
web applications.
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Figure 2.1: System model: user’s browser must show proof-of-work before the
web application accepts the user’s message. The dotted line indicates initial setup
performed by the web application to use the MetaCAPTCHA service.
An overview of the system model and high-level interactions between the Meta-
CAPTCHA service, the web client, and the corresponding web application is shown
in Figure 2.1. The interactions begin when a user attempts to perform an online
transaction. The web application allows the transaction to proceed only when it
has sufficient proof that the client completed the work it was assigned by Meta-
CAPTCHA.
The work is issued in the form of “puzzles”. Puzzles can be interactive, non-
interactive, or hybrid. Interactive puzzles are generally CAPTCHAs, whereas non-
interactive puzzles are pricing functions as described in Section 2.1.2. A hybrid
puzzle combines a CAPTCHA and a pricing function into one puzzle.
As shown in Figure 2.1, we treat the user separate from the browser while
collectively referring to them both as the client. This is due to the existence of
interactive puzzles that need user interaction to solve, and non-interactive puzzles
that are solved automatically by the browser.
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2.3 COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
This section discusses the MetaCAPTCHA communication protocol. For simplic-
ity, we assume a scenario where a client is attempting to post a message. Note,
however, that MetaCAPTCHA can protect more general web transactions like
purchasing event tickets, creating accounts, etc.
A web client begins communicating with MetaCAPTCHA after being referred
by the corresponding web application. In this case, the application will refer a
client attempting to post a message to MetaCAPTCHA. The client will then need
to obtain and solve a puzzle. The idea is that the web application will allow
messages from only those clients that have successfully solved a puzzle issued by
MetaCAPTCHA. The communication protocol for obtaining and solving a puzzle
begins with authentication as explained in the next section.
2.3.1 Authentication
MetaCAPTCHA only issues puzzles to clients of participating web applications.
This requires MetaCAPTCHA to authenticate (i) the identity of the web appli-
cation, and (ii) the client is an authorized user of the web application. Meta-
CAPTCHA provides each web application with an API key K during a registra-
tion phase. The web application must keep K secret as it will later be used for
authenticating both the application itself and all its clients.
As implied by the system model in Section 2.2, a client is not given access to
the services provided by the web application until it shows proof of a correctly
solved puzzle. The only way to be issued a puzzle is to first show that the client
is an authorized user of a registered web application. A client does so by pre-
senting to MetaCAPTCHA a “server-ticket” issued by the web application. The
authentication protocol used is modeled around Kerberos [91], wherein the web ap-
plication acts as the Ticket-Granting-Server (TGS) for the MetaCAPTCHA service
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1. Request for TGS ticket
2. Ticket for TGS
3. Request for Server ticket
4. Ticket for Server
5. Request for service
User/
1
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4
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TGS
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MetaCAPTCHA
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Figure 2.2: Kerberos authentication overview and how it relates to Meta-
CAPTCHA authentication. Figure adapted from Steiner et al. [91]
as shown in Figure 2.2 [cite steiner]. Notice that steps 1 and 2 of the Kerberos
protocol — where a client authenticates itself to Kerberos — are not required be-
cause MetaCAPTCHA assumes that it will be replaced by the web application’s
existing authentication mechanism (e.g password).
After a client submits a message, the web application returns a server-ticket
S1 = C||ID||HMAC(K,C||ID) containing client-specific information C, a web
application ID issued by MetaCAPTCHA during the registration phase, and a
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for C created using the web
application’s secret keyK (See Figure 2.3). The server-ticket S1 is called the puzzle-
request ticket and is sent by clients to MetaCAPTCHA for requesting puzzles.
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K: Web application’s secret key
Figure 2.3: MetaCAPTCHA authentication and puzzle solution verification
When MetaCAPTCHA receives the puzzle-request-ticket S1, it verifies that the
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client is indeed a user of a registered web application. MetaCAPTCHA performs
this verification by checking the integrity of the HMAC included in the ticket. No-
tice that the correct HMAC can only be generated by a registered web application
because it includes that application’s unique API key.
Once the integrity of the HMAC is ascertained by MetaCAPTCHA, the client
is issued a puzzle to solve. Details of client-specific information C are presented in
Section 2.3.2.
2.3.2 Puzzle Delivery and Verification
MetaCAPTCHA only issues puzzles to authenticated clients as previously shown.
The hardness of the issued puzzle depends on the client-specific information C =
(timestamp, message data) sent by the client to MetaCAPTCHA during the au-
thentication phase. Here, timestamp indicates when the message was created (this
assumes the web application and MetaCAPTCHA are loosely time-synchronized);
message data contains the message text submitted by the client and any other
information related to it. MetaCAPTCHA uses the information in C to compute
a reputation score, which in turn is used to determine the puzzle difficulty level :
the amount of time a user’s browser must compute to provide sufficient proof-of-
work to the web application. In MetaCAPTCHA, higher reputation scores imply
more malicious clients. As a result, such clients are issued puzzles with increased
difficulty levels. The details of how reputation scores are computed, and how puz-
zles of varying difficulty are generated are presented in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2
respectively.
It is important to note here that MetaCAPTCHA may issue multiple puzzles
during a single puzzle solving session. Puzzles are continuously issued until the
client has computed for an amount time similar to the estimated difficulty level.
Pre-determining a difficulty level eliminates the usual incentive of solving puzzles
faster. Furthermore, the estimated difficulty level is never directly revealed, thus
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Figure 2.4: The user’s web browser is continuously issued puzzles until it has spent
enough time computing. This amount of time is called the difficulty-level; the more
malicious the client, the higher the puzzle difficulty-level.
the client cannot make the decision to stop solving based on the amount of work
it needs to do. Figure 2.4 shows the puzzle solving protocol. More details are
presented in Section 2.4.2.
Once the user’s browser has solved all puzzles, it must send back the final
solution to MetaCAPTCHA. If the solutions are correct, MetaCAPTCHA will
issue the client a proof-of-work-ticket S2 = Ts||Te||HMAC(K,Ts||Te||S1), where
Ts and Te are the start and end time stamps of the puzzle solving session. The
client must present this ticket to the web application (see Figure 2.3), which will
then verify the ticket integrity before allowing the client to complete posting the
message. Additionally, if the difference between the current time and Te is greater
than some threshold tdiff , the client’s proof-of-work ticket is rejected.
2.4 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
In this section, we describe the main components of MetaCAPTCHA: the reputa-
tion service, the puzzle service, and the public API used by web applications and
their clients to access the aforementioned services. Briefly, the interactions be-
tween these individual components begin when MetaCAPTCHA receives a client’s
message. This message is first handled by MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service,
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which determines the client’s reputation score. The puzzle service then uses this
score to generate and issue a puzzle of an appropriate difficulty. Figure 2.5 shows
an overview of the various MetaCAPTCHA components and interactions, while
the following sections describe each of them.
Puzzle
Service
Reputation Service
DB
API
Client Server
Authenticators,
Session State,
Puzzles
Score
Classifier DB
Client Browser Application
Web
Akismet, etc.
Blacklist,
Training  DataPuzzle RequestPuzzle
Figure 2.5: Design of MetaCAPTCHA
2.4.1 Reputation Service
Proof-of-work systems that do not assign more “work” to malicious clients than
legitimate ones are easily circumvented [67]. Many existing systems do vary the
amount of work, but fail to characterize maliciousness appropriately. For example,
they base maliciousness on just one feature, such as system load [37, 61], a client’s
request rate [45, 44], contents of the request [111], or service demand [103, 104].
Without a defense-in-depth approach, it is unlikely that proof-of-work systems
will be able to deter automated adversaries. Additionally, if a reputation system
intends to be widely deployed, it must be capable of adapting to the needs of
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individual applications [68]. For example, Twitter may associate low reputation
with accounts that show aggressive following behavior [96], whereas Facebook may
do the same for accounts with abnormally large amount of ignored friend requests
[27]. MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service addresses these issues by allowing ap-
plications to easily configure the features that will determine a client’s reputation
score, and then use a Naive Bayes classifier to generically predict the score based
on the values of the configured features.
The reputation score is the probability that a given message is spam as deter-
mined by a Naive Bayes classifier. A client’s reputation score is calculated when a
message is posted to a web application and that client doesn’t have an existing rep-
utation. The score is dependent on the features of the message and the client that
sent it. A feature is any metric with a finite set of values. For example, blacklist
status of the message’s source IP address, SpamAssasin score of the message, or
number of times the poster was “thanked”. Given such message features and any
other client-related features provided by the web application, MetaCAPTCHA’s
reputation service can generate the client’s reputation score.
An important characteristic of a reputation system is its ability to react to
a client’s changing reputation. For example, if a user’s account is hijacked by a
spammer, her account’s reputation worsens; however, once the threat from the
hijacker is neutralized (say, by a password change) the reputation goes back to
normal. Thus, a good reputation service must be capable of identifying these
changes and assigning scores accordingly. MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service
adapts to reputation changes by incorporating time-varying features in determining
the reputation score. For example, relative account age, and relative number of
positive votes a user’s posts have received.
The reputation service is initialized by training the classifier using ground-truth
feature values for messages that have already been posted. Training information
about each message must include the values for each feature and its classification
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as spam or ham (not spam). The information about all messages is then fed to the
classifier, which builds a probability model to determine how likely a given new
message is spam. This likelihood or probability is called the reputation score and
its value ranges from 0 to 1 with higher scores implying more malicious users.
2.4.2 Puzzle Service
The puzzle service is responsible for authenticating users, using the contents of
their transaction (e.g. message, IP address) to obtain a reputation score from
the reputation service, converting that score to a puzzle difficulty, and finally,
issuing the user a puzzle of that difficulty. Note that the authentication protocol
was described in Section 2.3.1. Thus, in the following sections, we discuss the
remaining responsibilities of the puzzle service.
Reputation Score to Puzzle Difficulty
As mentioned before, puzzle difficulty is the amount of time a client must be kept
busy solving a puzzle. Traditionally, most puzzles have been CPU bound, caus-
ing devices with different processing speeds to solve the same puzzle for different
amounts of time. Abadi et al. highlighted this issue and proposed memory-bound
functions since memory access speeds vary much less across devices [16]. Memory
bound puzzles, unfortunately, are expensive to create and verify [40, 34]. Fur-
thermore, memory-bound puzzles limit the types of computation that can be per-
formed: we envisage a future where puzzles are generic computations whose results
are eventually reusable for solving larger problems like climate modeling, or curing
cancer [94].
MetaCAPTCHA’s approach is to first, determine the puzzle difficulty solely
based on the reputation score — in units of time — and then, continuously issue
puzzles until the client has computed for that pre-determined amount of time.
The benefit of this approach is that it gets rid of an adversary’s incentive to solve
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puzzles quicker (e.g. by offloading, or parallelizing the computation). What is
needed then, is a formula for converting the reputation score to a puzzle difficulty;
the rest of this section derives such a formula.
Intuitively, the formula must ensure that puzzle difficulty is proportional to the
reputation score since higher scores imply more malicious users. The remaining
questions, then, are (i) how fast should the difficulty grow with respect to the
reputation score? and (ii) for any given reputation score, what should the difficulty
value be to effectively reduce the amount of spam the web application receives?
The answer to Question (ii) is inspired by work on the impact of proof-of-work
systems on reducing spam by Laurie and Clayton [67]. We begin by fixing the
amount of spam reduction δ the web application seeks as a fraction of the total
number of spam messages sp it receives in time period tp. We can then determine
the maximum difficulty or amount of time tmax a spammer must be kept busy to
reduce the spam to sp − δsp:
tmax =
tp
sp(1− δ)
Notice that if the desired spam reduction δ = 1, the hardest puzzle a spammer
may have to solve would be infinitely long; causing MetaCAPTCHA to wait forever
for a solution! Since this is not feasible, the spam reduction fraction δ must be
judiciously chosen. Additionally, the tighter the choice of tp for the same sp, the
more accurate tmax will be. For example, assume a forum receives its first spam
message of the day at 8:00 am and last spam message at 5:00 pm. Then, choosing
tp = 9 hours as opposed to, say 24 hours, will lead to a more accurate value of
tmax.
Now, the answer to the question (i) depends on how accurately the reputation
service can determine a user’s reputation score; the more accurate it is, the less
time honest clients should have to spend solving puzzles. We will see later that
MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service aptly assigns≈ 90% of spammers a score over
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0.95. Since the reputation service is fairly accurate, we must fashion a function
that grows slowly until large reputation scores and then steeply afterwards. In
the case of the reference web application used to evaluate MetaCAPTCHA (see
Section 2.6.1), we empirically settled on the exponential function with a growth
constant of 5. However, another web application could choose a different growth
constant based on the shape of the curve desired.
Given the aforementioned growth function and maximum puzzle difficulty tmax,
we can compute the corresponding maximum reputation score rmax:
tmax = e
5rmax − 1
=⇒ rmax =
ln(tmax + 1)
5
We can then normalize the user’s current reputation score r with respect to rmax
and subsequently calculate puzzle difficulty t:
t = e5r·rmax − 1
=⇒ t = (tmax + 1)r − 1
Notice that when reputation score r = 1 (most malicious) the puzzle difficulty
t = tmax. Furthermore, when r = 0 (most honest), t = 0. This implies that an
honest user may not have to solve a puzzle at all, whereas a malicious user may
have to solve the hardest one.
Issuing Puzzles
Once the puzzle difficulty t is determined, the puzzle service randomly generates
a puzzle based on the list that is configured. The puzzle is then issued to the
client who must solve it and return a solution. If the solution is returned in
time t′ < t, then a new puzzle is chosen and issued. This process is repeated
until the client has computed for at least t amount of time. The idea behind
issuing several puzzles is to ensure that no user can complete an online transaction
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unless they have computed for a length of time ≥ t. An alternative is to first
determine how long it takes to solve a puzzle, and then just generate and issue
that puzzle. Unfortunately, the amount of time it takes to solve a puzzle varies
on different platforms, and so clients may get issued unfairly long or short puzzles
[16, 43]. For this reason, MetaCAPTCHA first computes the difficulty in units
of time, then the client is required to solve the puzzles accordingly. Also, notice
that the puzzle difficulty t is never revealed to the client, thus, there is no way
to know how long the computation will last. This creates a disincentive for bots
that would normally abandon puzzle computation altogether if t were known to
be large beforehand. An additional advantage of issuing multiple puzzles is that
each one can be randomly chosen, thus, preventing an attacker from being able
to predict the puzzles she will be issued. This eliminates a critical advantage an
adversary normally possesses: offline reverse engineering to find weaknesses. The
next section discusses the various puzzle types supported by MetaCAPTCHA.
Puzzle Types
Essentially, a puzzle type is a parameterized function. A puzzle-type with an
instantiated set of parameters is called a puzzle. Puzzles that require human inter-
action to solve (e.g. CAPTCHA) are called interactive puzzles, while those that
don’t (e.g. proof-of-work), are called non-interactive puzzles. MetaCAPTCHA
additionally supports hybrid puzzles that have both an interactive and a proof-
of-work component. The choice of which puzzle types to use depends on the web
application’s needs (See Figure 2.6).
Thus, MetaCAPTCHA is flexible and can be easily configured to support new
types of puzzles. In fact, MetaCAPTCHA is so named because it is a meta-
morphic puzzle issuing system and because it issues meta-puzzles rather than
specific puzzles. It is metamorphic because the client-side puzzle solver code is
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Figure 2.6: MetaCAPTCHA’s puzzle configuration dashboard.
non-deterministic. More specifically, the non-determinism results from issuing un-
predictable puzzles within a generic puzzle solver — the meta-puzzle. Thus, the
adversary has no way to know the client-side MetaCAPTCHA code beforehand.
Furthermore, issuing a meta-puzzle ensures that finding a weakness in one puzzle
type does not compromise MetaCAPTCHA as a whole. The following paragraphs
discuss the currently supported puzzle types.
Hint-based Hash-Reversal (non-interactive) Hash-reversal puzzles force clients
to reverse a given cryptographic hash of a random input, say x, with the k most
significant bits erased. However, they lack fine-grained difficulty control because
increasing k linearly, increases the solution search space exponentially. Hint-based
hash-reversal puzzles address this drawback by providing an additional hint : the
range of values to search.
Targeted Hash-Reversal (non-interactive) A targeted hash-reversal puzzle
[45] with difficulty d forces a client compute an expected number d of hashes before
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finding the right answer.
Modified Time-Lock (non-interactive) Time-lock puzzles [83] are based on
repeated squaring, a sequential process that forces the client to compute in a
tight loop for an amount of time that can be precisely controlled. Modified time-
lock puzzles on the other hand, retain most of the original properties of time-lock
puzzles, but are faster to generate and verify [46].
CAPTCHA (interactive) A reCAPTCHA [101] or Securimage [82] CAPTCHA
relayed to the client. MetaCAPTCHA only acts as a proxy for these CAPTCHA
services.
CAPTCHA+ (hybrid) A CAPTCHA+ puzzle includes a reCAPTCHA or Se-
curimage CAPTCHA along with a modified time-lock puzzle in the background.
The advantage of combining the approaches, in this case, is that changing the
difficulty of the time-lock puzzle changes the cost of solving the CAPTCHA. Con-
sequently, hybrid puzzles could circumvent CAPTCHA outsourcing attacks [76, 77]
since they enable the CAPTCHA solving cost to be changed.
2.4.3 Public API
The public API allows web applications and their clients to access MetaCAPTCHA
services. The web applications use the server-side API to (i) register and maintain
its account with MetaCAPTCHA, and (ii) as described in Section 2.3.1, use the
account’s unique API key to generate puzzle-request tickets for all their clients.
Web application clients implicitly use the client-side API during an online trans-
action, e.g. posting a message. More specifically, the API method calls are em-
bedded in the client-side web page that accepts the online transaction (similar to
a CAPTCHA setup). When the user “submits” the transaction, the client-side
API is used to obtain a puzzle-request ticket from the web application and hand
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it over to the MetaCAPTCHA service. Once MetaCAPTCHA returns a puzzle,
the client uses the solver — also a part of the client-side API — to compute and
return the puzzle solution.
2.5 IMPLEMENTATION
MetaCAPTCHA has been deployed with public APIs which any interested party
can download and use. A beta version of the MetaCAPTCHA service can be found
at http://www.metacaptcha.com/. We now discuss the implementation details
of each MetaCAPTCHA component in Figure 2.5.
2.5.1 Reputation Service
The reputation service is implemented in PHP. Associated with this service is a
NoSQL database, MongoDB [15], which stores the feature data required to deter-
mine user reputation. Initially, the web application provides the rows of feature
data necessary to train a Naive Bayes classifier implemented in Java by the Weka
[69] library. The trained classifier is then saved and used later when classifying
new messages sent by the web application’s users. Instead of using the binary
classification — spam or ham — that usually is the output of a Naive Bayes clas-
sifier, the reputation service uses the probability distribution that the classifier
determines in the step before performing the classification. That distribution rep-
resents MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation score which is a percentage likelihood that a
given message is spam.
To enable the reputation service to compute accurate reputation scores, a web
application can provide existing message and user data for training the classifier.
In the case of our reference web application, a live discussion forum that employed
MetaCAPTCHA’s spam prevention services from Sep 1 to Oct 19th 2012, the
classifier was given the following feature values for each existing message in the
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forum:
• Relative “Thanks” or “Likes”: the proportion of positive votes received by
the sender of the message.
• Language: the language the forum message was written in.
• Relative account age: the proportion of time an account has been alive with
respect to the age of the forum.
• Relative post count: the proportion of total posts published by a given ac-
count.
• DShield “Attacks” attribute: number of packets, from the message’s source
to a distinct destination, that were blocked.
• GEOIP: an estimate of the distance between the message poster and forum
server.
• Blacklist score: reputation score of the message source from Spamhaus [95].
The higher the score, the more malicious the source.
• Akismet score: Akismet [17] is a spam detection service that assigns a score
of 1 to a message it thinks is spam and 0 otherwise.
• SA Score: the spam score as determined by the SpamAssassin [90] service
running with only the Bayes plugin. The Bayes plugin uses a Naive Bayes
classifier to determine the probability that the contents of a message resemble
spam. SpamAssasin assigns a spam score between 1 and 5 to each message;
5 indicating that a message is most likely spam and 1 indicating that its not.
• isSpam: “yes” if forum moderator flagged the message as spam, “no” other-
wise.
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2.5.2 Puzzle Service
The puzzle service is implemented in PHP with an instance of the MongoDB
database. The database stores credentials needed to authenticate a particular
web application’s client, to create and retrieve session details of the client solving
puzzles. The authentication credentials include the web application’s 96-bit API
key, and an application ID; the session details store the received server ticket (see
Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2) and the amount of time the client has spent solving puzzles.
This amount of time when subtracted from the puzzle difficulty level determines if
the client needs a new sub-puzzle or not (see Section 2.4.2); the puzzles themselves
are stored in the database as members of JSON (JavaScript Object Notation)
objects and delivered in that format to clients. The parsing and execution of these
JSON objects by client-side JavaScript engines can be thought of as “solving” a
puzzle.
2.5.3 Client API
The client API includes JavaScript methods to request puzzles from MetaCAPTCHA,
execute or “solve” them, and return the result of the execution. These methods
must be embedded in an HTML form that accepts content from the users on be-
half of the web application. As part of “submitting” that form, the client API will
initiate the MetaCAPTCHA protocol to request a puzzle (see Section 2.3). The
puzzle will be returned as a JSON object that the client must parse, evaluate, and
then return the resulting value to MetaCAPTCHA.
The entire MetaCAPTCHA protocol occurs behind-the-scenes after a user
clicks the “Submit” button. This behind-the-scenes behavior is enabled by the
AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) technique used to implement the
MetaCAPTCHA communication protocol. Furthermore, puzzle execution is also
pushed to the background by employing JavaScript worker threads [102] which are
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now supported in newer versions of most popular browsers.
2.5.4 Server API
The server API consists of ≈ 150 lines of PHP code and requires minor modi-
fications to the web application for its default configuration. The modifications
are similar to those required by existing CAPTCHA APIs like reCAPTCHA [101].
Web applications use the server API to receive a client’s message, issue the cor-
responding server ticket necessary to request a puzzle from MetaCAPTCHA, and
verify the proof-of-work presented by clients that have solved the issued puzzle
(see Section 2.3).
2.6 RESULTS
We now evaluate MetaCAPTCHA and show that its defense-in-depth approach
improves spammer identification, that this identification is accurate, and that it is
an efficient spam prevention service.
2.6.1 Experimental Setup
MetaCAPTCHA was evaluated on a server with a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon quad-core
processor running Red Hat Linux on a 2.6.18 kernel. A live discussion forum active
from Sep 1 to Oct 19th 2012 employed MetaCAPTCHA as its spam prevention
service. MetaCAPTCHA’s effectiveness and performance have been evaluated in
the context of this forum. At the time, the forum had 2282 messages from 485
users in 112 sub-forums containing 997 conversation threads. Upon registration,
the forum provided most of this historical user and message data to help train
MetaCAPTCHA’s Naive Bayes classifier in identifying spam. Since the provided
data was considered ground-truth, a part of it was used to train the classifier and
the rest to evaluate it. The classification (spam or ham) was then compared with
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ground-truth to judge the classifier’s effectiveness. The data consisted of values
for all features described in Section 2.5.1 for each of 1442 messages posted to the
forum. We now describe the experiments used to evaluate MetaCAPTCHA.
2.6.2 Defense-in-Depth
Defense-in-depth strategy should yield better user reputation when using multiple
features as opposed to using only one or a few. Recall that a user’s reputation score
is the probability that the user’s message is spam. This probability is determined
by the Naive Bayes classifier. If the probability that a message is spam is higher
than the probability that it is not, the classifier tags the message as spam. There-
fore, the better the classifier is at identifying spam, the better it is at identifying
spammers and assigning appropriate reputation scores.
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Figure 2.7: Defense-in-depth: using multiple features for spam classification is
better than using one or a few. “Total” implies that all-of-the above features were
used for training the classifier.
We evaluated the spam identification accuracy of the classifier by using stan-
dard machine learning techniques. The idea was to measure the classifier’s precision
and recall ; precision is the fraction of messages that are actually spam (or ham)
among those classified as spam (or ham); recall is the fraction of actual spam (or
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ham) that gets classified correctly. A commonly used combined metric is the har-
monic mean of precision and recall, called the F-measure. Higher the F-measure,
better the classifier is at identifying spam.
We used 10-fold cross-validation to train and test the classifier on feature data
for 1442 messages. During each train-and-test run we limited the set of features
that the classifier could use. More specifically, in all but the last run, the classifier
was trained on one distinct feature. However, in the last run, it was trained on
all features together. The F-measure was then computed and plotted for each of
the runs. We can see in Figure 2.7 that the classifier’s F-measure is largest when
using all features together than when using any single one.
2.6.3 Reputation Accuracy
We evaluated the accuracy with which MetaCAPTCHA’s reputation service dis-
tinguished between spammers and honest users. To do this, we first divided forum
users into one of three categories, (i) spammers : those who sent only spam, (ii)
non-spammers : those who sent no spam, and (ii) mixed : those who sent both spam
and ham. Here, ’users’ implies the senders of messages included in ground-truth
information provided by the forum. After the categorization, there were 99 mes-
sages sent by non-spammers, 240 messages sent by spammers, and 151 messages
sent by mixed users in the test set (34% of ground-truth data picked uniformly
at random). We then fed these messages to MetaCAPTCHA’s classifier and ex-
tracted the reputation scores from the output (note that reputation scores range
from 0 to 1 and higher scores imply more malicious users). Finally, we plotted a
CDF of reputation scores for each category of users.
Figure 2.8 (a) shows that ≈ 90% of spammers have reputation scores over
0.95, whereas ≈ 99% of non-spammers got a reputation of 0.065 or less. Among
the honest users, only one suffered the ill fate of being assigned a reputation of
0.88, whereas 94% were assigned a reputation of zero — implying that they did
30
(a) Reputation score accuracy
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Spammer
Mixed
Non-Spammer
Reputation Score
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0.880.06
(b) Puzzle difficulty accuracy
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Spammer
Mixed
Non-Spammer
Puzzle Difficulty (hrs)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0.14 5.18
Figure 2.8: Reputation Accuracy: CDF of reputation scores and puzzle difficulties
assigned to spammers, non-spammers, and mixed users (those that sent at least 1
spam and 1 ham)
not solve a puzzle at all!
Although reputation scores have accurately identified spammers from non-
spammers, MetaCAPTCHA’s success depends on issuing harder puzzles to ma-
licious users. This requires evaluating the function that converts reputation score
to puzzle difficulty (see Section 2.4.2). We first computed the maximum puzzle
difficulty tmax = 6.82 hrs based on time period tp = 1 month, number of spam
messages sp seen in that month, and a spam reduction factor δ = 0.6. We then
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Figure 2.9: MetaCAPTCHA performance
plotted a CDF, shown in Figure 2.8 (b), of the difficulty of puzzles issued to spam-
mers, non-spammers, and mixed users for each message they sent. We can see
that in this scenario, ≈ 90% of spammers solved a puzzle over 6 hrs long, ≈ 5% of
non-spammers solved a puzzle between 7.2 secs and 8.4 minutes long, and ≈ 95%
of non-spammers solved no puzzles at all.
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2.6.4 Performance
We evaluated the performance of MetaCAPTCHA in terms of CPU usage, memory
consumption, and time spent in authenticating and issuing puzzles to users. We
used Apache JMeter [93], a Java application that load-tests servers, to generate 1 -
100 concurrent puzzle requests incrementing each time by 20 to MetaCAPTCHA.
Each test run (e.g. 1, 20, 40, etc.) was repeated over a 100 times and the aver-
age measurement (e.g. CPU usage) was plotted against the number of concurrent
connections. The 95% confidence interval for the mean of each measurement was
also calculated. However, the intervals might be too small to spot in the graphs.
Figures 2.9 (a) - (c) show the amount of time, CPU, and memory consumed to
authenticate the user, determine reputation score and puzzle difficulty, and gen-
erate the first puzzle. Although the time consumed was not prohibitive, we were
interested in determining where most of it was used. A more detailed analysis,
shown in Figure 2.10, revealed that a majority of the time was spent in the repu-
tation service when querying other remote services like Akismet [17], and blacklists
like Spamhaus [95]. In the future, we hope to eliminate remote queries and mirror
the applicable blacklists to significantly reduce the time required for issuing the
first puzzle. Note that after the first puzzle, issuing subsequent ones only requires
generating a new random puzzle (without the need for computing puzzle difficulty,
or authenticating the user). Figures 2.9 (d) - (f) depict the resources consumed
while issuing subsequent puzzles.
2.7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
MetaCAPTCHA’s goal is to address threats from automated adversaries like spam
bots. The following paragraphs discuss those threats and how MetaCAPTCHA
defends against them.
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Figure 2.10: Breakdown (%) of the time spent in issuing the first puzzle. Notice
that 68% of the time is spent in the reputation service due to all the remote queries
that happen there.
Bots may attempt to post spam in the web application. However, with Meta-
CAPTCHA protections in place, those attempts will result in a puzzle-request-
ticket. Thus, preventing any efforts to directly post spam.
Bots may attempt to show proof-of-work without ever doing the work. However,
they will be unable to forge a proof-of-work-ticket without the web application’s
secret API key.
Bots could present a proof-of-work-ticket for one message, but try to post an-
other. However, since proof-of-work-tickets contain a digest of the original message,
the ticket’s verification will fail when associated with a new message.
Bots could replay old proof-of-work-tickets. However, as mentioned in Section
2.3.2, clients only have a small amount of time tdiff to submit the proof-of-work
ticket. Thus, the same ticket cannot be replayed after tdiff time.
Bots could find short-cut methods to solve puzzles. However, since Meta-
CAPTCHA forces adversaries to solve puzzles for a pre-determined amount of
time (the puzzle difficulty), solving a puzzle faster will only result in more puzzles
to solve.
Bots may attempt to reuse the solutions of puzzles solved in the past. Recall,
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that puzzles are randomly selected and parameterized before being issued. Thus,
bots will have to store an old puzzle in hopes of finding an exact match sometime
in the future. We conjecture that this probability is negligible for the types of
puzzles currently supported.
MetaCAPTCHA could be the target of a DoS attack where a flood of puzzle
requests causes it to create states for an unsustainable number of puzzle sessions.
However, effects of such attacks can be mitigated by using puzzle outsourcing
techniques [105].
MetaCAPTCHA determines a user’s reputation based on information related
to messages posted by that user (e.g. contents, source IP). This may be a privacy
concern for those who may trust the web application with their messages, but
not MetaCAPTCHA. A possible solution to this problem is to eliminate privacy-
sensitive features from being used for determining reputation. The drawback,
however, would be reduced reputation score accuracy. Another way, would be
to empower the application to provide a local reputation score based on privacy-
sensitive features. This local score could then be combined with the one determined
remotely by MetaCAPTCHA to provide an accurate characterization of reputation.
We hope to explore these avenues in future research.
Currently, MetaCAPTCHA issues puzzles without considering the platform
it will be solved on. Thus, some clients may solve puzzles for longer than the
amount of time determined by MetaCAPTCHA. One possibility is to use browser
fingerprinting techniques [78] to determine the client’s CPU speed and then issue
puzzles accordingly. We also hope to address this direction of research in future
work.
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3
VOLUNTEER COMPUTING WORKLOADS AS USEFUL
PROOF-OF-WORK
Spammers are continually looking to circumvent counter-measures seeking to slow
them down. One approach for dealing with spam is to force the spammer’s machine
to solve a computational problem of varying difficulty before granting access. The
idea is that suspicious or problematic requests are given more difficult problems to
solve while legitimate requests are allowed through with minimal computation. Un-
fortunately, most systems that employ this model waste the computing resources
being used, as they are directed towards solving cryptographic problems which
provide no societal benefit. While systems such as reCAPTCHA and FoldIt have
allowed users to contribute solutions to useful problems interactively, an analogous
solution for non-interactive proof-of-work does not exist. Towards this end, this
chapter describes reBOINC, a system for supporting useful proof-of-work that is
integrated into a web spam throttling service. reBOINC provides a framework
that enables the computational resources of spammers to be redirected towards
meaningful research. To validate the efficacy of the approach, prototype imple-
mentations based on OpenCV and BOINC are described that demonstrate the
ability to harvest spammer’s resources for beneficial purposes.
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3.1 reBOINC APPROACH
3.1.1 Challenges and Solutions
One of the challenges in leveraging BOINC is that the workloads are specifically
designed to run on the operating system (OS). In the reBOINC approach, the same
applications must be adapted to operate on web browsers without compromising
the utility of the whole scheme. For example, reBOINC allows binary applications
delivered from a BOINC project to run on a client’s web browser without additional
software installed on that client’s machine. As BOINC is not modeled for the web
environment, making it work without extensive modification is difficult. When run
natively on top of a full-fledged OS, the applications have full access to existing
system libraries. In contrast, web browsers typically have limited access to such
OS facilities.
One possible solution is to rewrite the binary applications in current browser
scripting languages such as Javascript. Unfortunately, reimplementing BOINC sci-
entific applications in Javascript is prone to error, requires significant development
cost on a per-application basis, and results in poor performance. To address this
problem, reBOINC utilizes Native Client (NaCl), an open-source technology that
allows secure native execution of binary code within web browsers. NaCl enables
an adapted version of BOINC applications to run on web browsers with minimal
modification.
The second challenge is that the concept of useful computations is generally
new to the web browser. There is very little practical support to run scientific
code on a modern web browser. Perhaps the closest analogous application is the
use of Javascript to mine Bitcoins [2]. While Bitcoin computations are good for
generating monetary value, the software itself can not be used for arbitrary scien-
tific computations that benefit society. To address this challenge and to support
large classes of useful computations on the web, reBOINC adapts the Open Source
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Computer Vision Library (OpenCV) to run within web browsers. Since OpenCV
is used in a wide-range of image processing and computer vision applications,
adapting the library to the NaCl environment allows reBOINC to support a large
number of existing BOINC applications. As a result, reBOINC enables thousands
of existing, useful, CPU-intensive algorithms in the area of object detection, object
recognition, statistical machine learning and more.
Another challenge is that the coarse granularity of BOINC applications is not
suitable for web applications. In order for the reBOINC approach to work, it re-
quires client browsers to download a large amount of BOINC scientific software and
data. The size of this software is large and their calculations can potentially take
a long time to finish. These characteristics are unwelcome in the fast, per-request
nature of the web. In addition, such computations are complete non-starters for
users on smartphones and tablets. With mobile access to web services rapidly
growing, any counter-measure must ensure the quality of the user experience.
To meet this challenge, reBOINC uses a credit-based approach towards the
use of its challenges. Rather than requiring work to be done on a per-transaction
basis, reBOINC challenges are only issued on events that are rare for normal users
to encounter. Specifically, challenges are typically targeted for delivery at account
creation or during account recovery. Thus, after account establishment, as long as
the account has not been hijacked or used in an anti-social manner, users directly
access the web application unimpeded. In contrast, because spammer accounts are
shut down rather quickly, spammers are required to create accounts continuously
and would thus be forced to execute the computations often. In this manner, not
only is the granularity problem addressed, but also the usability problem that the
reBOINC proof-of-work protocol has with mobile devices.
Lastly, the most important challenge is the fact that the solutions of the useful
computations are not easily verified. Useful computations in reBOINC are general-
purpose, outsourced computations from the BOINC projects. These computations
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are fundamentally different from traditional proof-of-work puzzles in that the so-
lutions are not known apriori. To address this, a significant amount of work has
been done on verifiable computations. Research has resulted in solutions such as
using trusted hardware [85, 32], assuming failures are independent and replicating
the computation [70, 72, 57, 28, 19], auditing [75] or attestation [81, 87], and us-
ing probabilistically checkable proofs where the computations can be verified with
small probability of being wrong [66, 50, 48, 20, 21, 88, 56].
While most of these solutions are robust, they fall under one of the categories:
assuming trust in the hardware or the middleware; requiring detailed knowledge
of the intermediate results; or altering the software to enforce checkable proofs
and cryptographic functions. However, these conditions are unsuitable for the re-
BOINC approach since (a) reBOINC’s goal is to keep minimal modification to
the client browsers as well as the BOINC projects and (b) requiring hardware
trust, detailed knowledge of the software or infusing checkable proofs and cryp-
tographic algorithms to scientific computations would incur significant developer
overhead. Towards this end, reBOINC employs a variety of simple security tech-
niques including support for metamorphism1 and replication2. These techniques
allow reBOINC to securely channel useful computations as proof-of-work without
adding significant additional development cost.
3.1.2 System Model
The reBOINC system is constructed on top of MetaCAPTCHA - a currently run-
ning proof-of-work anti-spam web service built in our previous work [41, 13]. The
reBOINC system, to our knowledge, is the first system built on a working spam
1The useful computations are issued using many kind of proof-of-work whose answers are
known and unknown.
2Issuing the same useful computation to multiple clients in order to catch discrepancies.
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Figure 3.1: System model: The client browser has to compute useful computations
in order to gain a signed cookie (the proof-of-work) from the reBOINC system.
Solid arrows represent requests, dashed ones represent responses and dotted ones
are periodic communications and/or one-time setup.
throttling web service, to leverage the workloads from scientific research as proof-
of-work.
The reBOINC system model consists of web applications that need protection
against attacks, a volunteer computing network (VC network), and clients running
a modern web browser. The model forces client browsers to perform a useful com-
putation from the VC network before releasing resources from the web applications
being protected. The web applications need to perform a one-time registration with
our service in order to install an anti-spam plugin. The model does not require
special modification to the VC network. However, the network needs to have its
binary executable ported to the NaCl platform and its workloads configured to
work with the reBOINC system. The porting process is a standard procedure in
supporting new platforms in most VC networks such as in BOINC. The model
also requires the web browsers to support native execution of binary code. Cur-
rently, Google Chrome and Chromium are the only two browsers supporting this
technology.
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the high-level interactions of all the components of the
reBOINC model. First a client browser requesting certain resources such as reg-
istering an account will be required to show his proof-of-work. This request will
be redirected to the reBOINC system where the description of how to obtain that
proof will be retrieved. At this state, instead of using traditional proof-of-work,
the system describes the computations of the useful proof-of-work. Additional
data may be downloaded from the VC network to compute the work according to
the proof description. When the work is done, the answers are submitted to the
reBOINC system and a signed cookie is created if the answers were correct. This
cookie is used to release the protected resources from the web applications. Since
the useful proof-of-work and answers are outsourced computations from the VC
network, synchronization phases are needed periodically where the results are sub-
mitted to the network and new workloads are streamed back to the reBOINC sys-
tem.
3.1.3 Threat Model
The security threats relevant to the former model mainly come from the client
browsers. Although the reBOINC model is similar to the volunteer computing one
in that the owners of the utilizing machines are not trusted, reBOINC faces an
enormous amount of relentless spammers whereas the volunteer computing only
has a fraction of cheaters. In reBOINC’s security model, the client browsers are
completely untrusted and assumed to be unfaithful. In contrast, the web applica-
tion and the VC network are assumed to be trusted components.
The security model assumes that the communications from a client browser to a
web application, and the redirecting data from a client browser to the reBOINC sys-
tem are properly signed so that any tampering can be detected. In the re-
BOINC system, this data signing and checking is handled by the MetaCAPTCHA’s
APIs and web application plugins (MetaCAPTCHA is modeled around Kerberos
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[80] - an authentication granting and signing protocol). The model also assumes
that the augmented anti-spam web service such as MetaCAPTCHA is functioning
properly and has the ability to judge the maliciousness of requests to determine the
amount of computation a client browser must perform (i.e. a reputation service).
3.2 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The reBOINC approach relies on several essential components to operate including
Native Client (NaCl), the Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing
(BOINC), the Open Source Computer Vision project (OpenCV) and the Meta-
CAPTCHA anti-spam web service.
3.2.1 Native Client
NaCl is a technology developed by Google to allow untrusted binaries to run safely
in a sandboxed environment in the web. Experiments have shown that this tech-
nology enables C/C++ applications to run in the browsers with near native speed
[107]. An NaCl application composes of a binary executable file and dependency
libraries, and a manifestation file that describes the instructions to load the pro-
gram for different processors. The application is compiled using the NaCl GCC
toolchain and downloaded to the browser over HTTP requests.
The technology supports communication with Javascript, extending the infras-
tructure of the web browser. The communication is allowed through an asyn-
chronous message posting system where each side will have a listener to interpret
the message event on the other side. Currently, only Google Chrome and the
Chromium browser support NaCl as a built-in module. The module is enabled
automatically when an NaCl application is initialized through the Chrome Web
Store. Otherwise, the users must manually enable it.
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3.2.2 BOINC
BOINC is an open-source client-server middleware infrastructure for volunteer and
grid computing [18]. To participate in volunteer computing projects using BOINC,
a volunteer participant must register an account at the project webpage as well as
install and log in to the software on the OS. The software will then automatically
download useful computations and run them while the computer is idle.
A BOINC project consists of three main components. The first is the BOINC
server which stores, schedules and distributes workunits (BOINC’s terminology for
workloads) to a volunteer’s machine as well as collecting the results. A workunit
is a single task with input files to be executed by the client software running on
the volunteer’s OS. The server has two CGI scripts to allow communication with
its client software via HTTP. One script performs the scheduling role to distribute
workunits and to receive the result, while the other handles actual result’s files
uploaded by the client software.
The second component is the BOINC client software which runs on the OS of
the volunteer’s machines. The client software authenticates with different BOINC
projects before receiving any workload. After authenticating, the software fetches
the scientific applications for its processor along with the workunits. These ap-
plications will be executed by the client software at a certain point on the OS.
When finished, the software submits the result to the appropriate BOINC servers.
This client software allows a single participant’s machine to contribute to multiple
volunteer computing projects.
The last component is the BOINC scientific application which is a custom
program usually written in C/C++ by scientists to carry out useful computations.
The application is executed with input downloaded from the BOINC server when
the participant’s computer is idle. In order to support multiple projects with a
single client software, each project has its own configuration file set up during the
first time the software authenticates with the BOINC servers.
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3.2.3 OpenCV
OpenCV is an open-source, cross-platform library that facilitates real-time com-
puter vision applications. Due to its complexity, there is currently no support to
run OpenCV on web browsers. By adapting the library to the web, however, a
large class of useful computations are enabled since there are a myriad applications
that require some form of image processing and recognition. Adapting OpenCV to
run on a web browser is challenging because OpenCV uses a synchronous, block-
ing I/O model whereas web browsers use an asynchronous, non-blocking one. The
library also requires a file system API that supports persistent storage in order to
implement its I/O operations. To overcome this challenge, reBOINC adapts the
file I/O calls in OpenCV to an existing library supporting a virtual memory file
system. The library allows NaCl applications which use OpenCV to run in many
operating systems without user intervention.
3.2.4 MetaCAPTCHA
Many web sites use CAPTCHAs to protect themselves against automated ad-
versaries. Previous work on metamorphic CAPTCHAs has resulted in the Meta-
CAPTCHA3 web service which dynamically supports a variety of anti-spam counter-
measures based on both CAPTCHAs and computational puzzles. Our implementa-
tion of reBOINC leverages MetaCAPTCHA’s existing infrastructure and user-base
in order to demonstrate the utility of useful computations in thwarting automated
attacks.
As depicted in Figure 3.2, there are three distinct components of the Meta-
CAPTCHA web service: a server, a middleware for the client browser and a plugin
for the web applications. The server constructs, stores and distributes proof-of-
work puzzles to its clients. The server also implements a reputation service to
3http://www.metacaptcha.com
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Figure 3.2: MetaCAPTCHA anti-spam web service overview
intelligently deliver more difficult puzzles to adversarial requests while allowing
legitimate requests to go through.
The client is comprised of a web browser that wants to access protected re-
sources from a participating web application. The client browser will contact the
server with a signed request. This request will be routed through MetaCAPTCHA
to determine a difficulty level and the proof-of-work challenges to use. The client
browser then solves the different computations until the server signals completion.
The middleware that manages the execution on the client browser is a
Javascript application. This application is involved whenever the client requests
resources from a MetaCAPTCHA-protected web application. When invoked, the
middleware dynamically instantiates the sub-puzzles the server issues the client in
an iterative manner. The browser is then forced to solve each one successfully in
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order to proceed.
The plugin is a module for web applications seeking to use MetaCAPTCHA to
thwart spammers. Each participating web application embeds and configures this
plugin to protect resources in its website. When configured, the plugin will contain
an API key and a shared secret key to ensure secure communication between the
web application and the MetaCAPTCHA service.
The MetaCAPTCHA server contains two services to throttle spam attacks: the
puzzle service and the reputation service. The puzzle service supports the creation
and execution of the proof-of-work puzzles to be carried out by the client browsers.
It assembles the input data and puzzle solvers according to client’s reputation and
request. It then sends these back to the middleware to execute. When the results
are submitted from the client, the service validates the output and authorizes the
request to the protected resources assuming the answers were correct.
The reputation service is essentially a spam filter module with machine learning
capability. However, instead of deciding whether a request is spam or not, the
service produces an analog value to determine how likely the request is a malicious
one. This analog value is then handled by the puzzle service to generate client
puzzles with appropriate difficulties. This construction of MetaCAPTCHA allows
flexibility in the kind of computational puzzles that are employed. For example,
the service supports interactive puzzles (reCAPTCHA), non-interactive puzzles
(time-lock, hash reversal) and hybrid ones which combine the other two kinds of
puzzles [41].
3.3 DESIGN
3.3.1 reBOINC Proof-of-work Model
In a typical cryptographic proof-of-work model, the system is designed so that
the anti-social clients are punished leaving the resources protected for legitimate
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clients. This model works since cryptographic functions can be constructed to
have a special property such that the solutions to the functions are hard to find
but relatively easy to verify. In order for computations to be useful, the solutions to
reBOINC computations from third-parties typically do not have such a property,
making it difficult to detect unfaithful execution. For example, an adversary can
exploit the system by finding a shortcut to skip the work being asked without
computing appropriate answers.
To overcome these challenges, reBOINC leverages well-known techniques from
malware and outsourced computing to strengthen the system’s resilience against
adversaries. These techniques include the Metamorphic Chain of Computations for
preventing adversaries from predicting system’s behaviors; the Probabilistic Check
of Duplicated Result for ensuring that the work verification process is relatively fast;
and the Computational Banking System with Recovery for preventing persistent
abusive behavior.
Metamorphic Chain of Computations
Unlike traditional BOINC networks where users are generally volunteers with a
few cheaters, the reBOINC network consists of a large population of spammers
that hunt for ways to exploit the system. For this reason, finding methods to
obstruct the adversaries from understanding the system is a step toward a more
secure system. Inspired by the way malware changes its forms during execution, the
reBOINC system randomizes the types of computations and the binary executables
while the client browser is computing. An adversary who wants to launch an
attack against the network will essentially have to reverse engineer the chain as it
is executing using a debugger.
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Probabilistic Check of Duplicated Result
In the reBOINC model, it is impossible to determine the validity of the result since
the computations are from third-parties. Even when the result can be validated,
there is no guarantee that verifying the result will be significantly quicker than
computing them. Similar to reCAPTCHA, reBOINC addresses this challenge by
precomputing a small subset of the useful computations to determine the result.
These precomputed computations are randomly inserted into the chain of useful
computations. When the results come back from the client, they are checked by
the system to determine the validity of the whole chain. If any of the known
computations have incorrect results, the entire chain is rejected and the user’s IP
is suspended from the system. Note that random verification checks can also be
randomly performed at any point after the useful work has been submitted by the
client.
Computational Banking System with Recovery
Prevention of anti-social behavior in reBOINC is a continuous process. In our
system, upon performing the useful work, clients are given a computational credit
that the system tracks. Credits are deducted from the client when it behaves in-
appropriately such as by sending spam or by submitting incorrect computations.
When the client’s credit reaches zero, that account is banned from further posting
until the client has solved a new chain of useful computations. This way, a com-
promised account or an adversary who attempts to bypass the computation will
not be able to abuse the system for long. In addition, we argue that this method
mitigates the impact of false positives as legitimate users are asked to recover their
account by contributing to research that benefits society.
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Figure 3.3: reBOINC system overview. The dotted boxes are reBOINC modifica-
tions to the MetaCAPTCHA service.
3.3.2 MetaCAPTCHA Modifications
To facilitate the creation and execution of useful computations, reBOINC aug-
ments both the puzzle service and the reputation service of MetaCAPTCHA to
support useful computational capabilities. The two adapted services are the com-
putational banking service and the useful puzzle service. These adapted services
channel meaningful workloads from BOINC and convert them to proof-of-work.
This adaptation retains the model and the practicality of MetaCAPTCHA. Figure
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3.3 represents the full system model of reBOINC woven into the MetaCAPTCHA
infrastructure.
The useful puzzle service orchestrates the chain of useful computations for the
client browsers. It dictates how many computations are enough until a registra-
tion application is complete, where to get the workload from, and what specific
computation the client needs to do. By building into the existing infrastructure
of MetaCAPTCHA, the service is able to randomly switch between different kinds
of computations that MetaCAPTCHA supports. For example, a BOINC scientific
application and a group of control functions whose results are known can be in-
tertwined to form a chain of computations. This makes it more difficult for the
adversary to predict and fake the results of useful computations.
Computational Banking Service
Figure 3.4 illustrates the architecture of the computational banking service which
implements the credit-based recovery strategy. The service augments the existing
reputation service of MetaCAPTCHA. Since useful computations are intended to
be used at account registration, there typically isn’t sufficient information for the
reputation service to determine whether or not the account sign-up is fraudulent.
As a result, the computational banking service can be configured to allocate a
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fixed length computation as specified by the web application being protected. The
client accounts will obtain a credit value corresponding to this computation after
they have successfully computed the chain. This credit remains with the account
until it is used in an anti-social manner and is only taken away when the account
behaves poorly.
Useful Puzzle Service
The architecture of the useful puzzle service is depicted in Figure 3.5. The service
handles two different requests, an answer to a computation and a request for
new proof-of-work. The answer is checked for correctness by a validator which
implements the probabilistic check of duplicated result strategy. The request for
new proof-of-work is handled by a morpher that implements the metamorphic
chain of computations model. The morpher decides the chain of computations to be
issued to the client. The morpher also decides the workunits and the kind of useful
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computations for the client browser. Then the morpher wraps the computation
as a BOINC wrapper computation and hands this wrapper to MetaCAPTCHA’s
puzzle service. This BOINC wrapper allows NaCl applications to be executed in
MetaCAPTCHA’s middleware.
BOINC Server Component
The BOINC server is an external but essential component of our system. It can
be owned and operated by any organization over the Internet, not only by the
reBOINC operators. This means that a reBOINC system can connect with as
many BOINC projects as it is compatible with. The compatibility can be achieved
by porting the BOINC scientific applications and configuring the projects for the
Native Client platform. By having this wide support, our architecture can create a
broader impact since a large number of existing BOINC projects can be executed
by web browsers, making it possible to connect a large pool of useful computations
with an enormous number of web clients.
3.3.3 Architecture and Communication
Since the system depends on third-parties to provide meaningful workloads, it is
easy for others to support and communicate with the system. With that design
goal in mind, the system requires minimal modification to the BOINC codebase.
Towards this end, the system is designed so that the reBOINC servers, combined
with the client browsers, act as regular BOINC client software. This combination
is relatively straight-forward since NaCl on the browser and the BOINC client
software support a similar programming model. The reBOINC servers effectively
behave as a BOINC client, but rather than executing the workloads themselves,
they manipulate the input and outsource the computational package in the NaCL
version to the users’ browsers. In fact, our communication protocol doesn’t require
any modification to BOINC source code at all. The only major code revamp is
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porting the scientific application from the native system libraries to the NaCl ones.
However, this is just a standard process in working with any platform the BOINC
project supports.
Figure 3.6 shows how the combination mimics the communications of the
BOINC client software. The communication process consists of a one-time, per
BOINC project configuration stage, a real-time scheduling stage and a result han-
dling stage.
Configuration Stage
A BOINC client needs to have a registered account and configured attributes to
instruct the BOINC server to get what application and when. Similarly, the re-
BOINC system stores the registered accounts for many BOINC projects as well
as their configured attributes and scientific applications. This configuration state
(Steps a and b in Figure 3.6) will setup the XML authentication files of each
BOINC project, precompute some workunits and cache the NaCl applications of
BOINC projects in the system.
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Scheduling Stage
The scheduling stage is effectively how the reBOINC system uses its useful ser-
vices to provide meaningful workloads. Steps 1-5 in Figure 3.6 illustrate this
stage. When an HTTP request is made from the client browser, the reBOINC sys-
tem reads the appropriate BOINC projects from its database. The useful services
transform the request into a BOINC wrapper puzzle for a specific scientific appli-
cation. The system then hands the puzzle back to the client browser as a chain of
computations.
Result Handling Stage
The result handling stage is controlled by the synchronizer. Since the results com-
ing from the client browsers are not completely trusted, they are held in our server
to validate until another client browser confirms the same result. Subsequently,
the collection of confirmed results will be sent to the appropriate BOINC server
and the workload cycle is completed. This stage corresponds to Steps c and d in
Figure 3.6.
3.4 IMPLEMENTATION
There are three key components to the reBOINC system: the useful services,
the BOINC wrapper, and a prototype NaCl application of a BOINC project that
supports an environmental monitoring project in Oregon.
3.4.1 Useful Services
The useful services are written in PHP using a NoSQL database (MongoDB).
The services employ a cron job to periodically fetch new workloads from various
BOINC projects. These workloads are then parsed to get input file URLs and
workunit information. The workunits are stored in the database in two sets, one
54
with already computed answers and one without. The computed set consists of
answers generated by both the server and the clients. The server generates the
computed set during the configuration stage for every new BOINC project, then
the set is populated with verified results submitted by the clients.
When a client browser needs to be issued a computation, the useful services
check the database for the current progress of the client. If that client browser
is new (e.g. has never created an account in the protected web application), the
services create a new chain of computations by mixing the unanswered workunits
with answered ones, then they associate the workunits with binary executables and
send the client the first computation. Upon completion, the next computation in
the chain is fetched and returned to the client browser until the chain is complete.
When a result is submitted to the server by a client browser, the services verify
the validity of the result by checking it against the chain of computations in the
database. If the result belongs to a known computation in the chain, it is compared
with a stored answer. An incorrect result will get the client’s IP suspended from
the system whereas a correct one will have the next computation in the chain
returned to the client. If the whole chain was correctly verified, the system creates
a signed cookie and returns it to the middleware where it will be used to allow the
client browser to access the protected web application.
3.4.2 BOINC Wrapper
The BOINC wrapper’s task is to provide an easy way to execute and control NaCl
scientific applications on the web browser. The wrapper is written in Javascript
and delivered to a client upon being issued a useful proof-of-work computation.
First, the wrapper loads an HTML iframe from the server into the current web
page of the client. Since this iframe resides on the reBOINC server, any changes
to the NaCl applications can be reflected in the iframe without intervention to
the user’s browsers or the web application’s plugins. This iframe is also used to
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(a) Example fish ladder image (b) Manual fish counting
Figure 3.7: Bonneville Dam Fish Ladder
bypass the cross-domain policy of the browser since it allows resources from the
server embedded in the iframe, and the iframe to have the same origin. Next,
the wrapper loads NaCl applications in the server into objects in the iframe. The
iframe’s script initializes the applications with workunit information and executes
them. Finally, when results are returned from the applications, they are returned
back to the middleware where they will be submitted for verification.
3.4.3 NaCl Application
To demonstrate the utility of the reBOINC system, we have been developed a
proof-of-concept prototype that involves counting fish. To protect salmon runs in
the Pacific Northwest, dams have fish ladders that salmon must climb to spawn.
From an environmental policy standpoint, it is essential that an accurate measure
of the number of salmon passing through is taken in order to quantify the impact
the dam has on salmon populations. This measurement impacts the decision as
to how much water the dam releases every day. To support this, cameras are
pointed at the ladder [98] and a full-time employee is tasked with counting them
for several hours a day. Figure 3.7(a) shows an example image captured from the
camera pointed at the Bonneville Dam fish ladder and Figure 3.7(b) shows the set
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up used to count fish. Currently, the counting is performed manually by taking
samples across several hours in the day and extrapolating to determine a final daily
estimate of fish passing through the ladder. This manual process is expensive to
perform and, as a result, the Bonneville Power Administration has sought out
researchers to automate the task. Fish counting is particularly desirable in the
context of this project since it is work that is continuously generated and involves
implementing an image recognition algorithm that can be easily adapted as useful
proof-of-work.
We have set up a prototype NaCl-friendly BOINC project for the fish counting
application. The application is implemented using C++ and the OpenCV library.
The OpenCV library itself was ported to the NaCl environment and built as a
dynamic library. This library is linked with the application to allow OpenCV-
enabled executables to be run on the web without any additional software installed.
In addition, the application and the OpenCV library were equipped with a virtual
memory file system in order to handle asynchronous I/O operations.
When invoked by the iframe’s script, the browser will accept workunit informa-
tion and additional data URLs from reBOINC. After that, the application down-
loads a series of images and a classifier cascade for object detection. Next, the im-
ages and classifier files are mapped into virtual files allowing the OpenCV library
to access them. Then, the application uses OpenCV object detection functions to
recognize the coordinates of the fish in each image and returns the result to the
wrapper.
3.5 EVALUATION
To evaluate reBOINC, we examine both its client-side and the server-side perfor-
mance. On the client-side, we measure the user experience while running scientific
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Figure 3.8: Browser’s resource ultilization while running NaCl fish counting appli-
cation and watching Youtube videos in 360p, 720p and 1080p format.
applications and the performance of the applications running in the browser com-
pared to native OS. We compare this performance with the performance of a sim-
ilar implementation of the application in Javascript. We show that our prototype
application provides significantly better performance than a Javascript implemen-
tation. On the server-side, we evaluate the server’s utilization and performance in
constructing useful proof-of-work, validating results and synchronizing data with
the BOINC network. While there is room for improvement, our results show that
the approach is feasible.
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Figure 3.9: Performance of fish counting application running on OS vs. NaCl vs.
Javascript
Latency Peak Memory Mean Memory
New Useful PoW 522.02± 4.9× 101 ms 9.64± 8.8× 10−1 Mb 6.96± 4.0× 10−4 Mb
Verify Answer 14.70± 2.2 ms 5.88± 3.2× 10−1 Mb 5.29± 1.1× 10−3 Mb
Stream Workloads 42.31± 6.3 ms 0.79± 6.0× 10−4 Mb 0.75± 2.8× 10−4 Mb
Submit Answers 43.03± 5.0 ms 1.17± 1.1× 10−1 Mb 1.15± 1.1× 10−1 Mb
Table 3.1: The reBOINC server performance and overheads
3.5.1 Client User Experience
We measured the resource utilization of the browser while running the fish counting
application for about eight minutes on Google Chrome v31.0.1650.57 on a x86 64
testing machine. The machine was equipped with 8Gb of RAM and an Intel i7
2.4Ghz processor running on Ubuntu 12.04, Kernel v3.5.0. We compared this with
the resource utilization of watching three popular Youtube videos for the same
duration in 360p, 720p and 1080p video quality. The measurements were done
by using the ps utility on Ubuntu to capture the utilization of Google Chrome
processes. The tool was setup to take a sample of the browser’s utilization every
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one to three seconds.
Figure 3.8 (a) and (b) shows the CPU usage in percentage and memory usage in
Mb of the browser on the y axis over time on the x axis respectively. The memory
usage of the application was 3-6 times less than watching videos on Youtube. On
the other hand, the CPU usage of the application is more similar to watching a
Youtube video at 360p quality format in the first minute. However, in the long
run, the average CPU usage of the application went down to 4.2 ± 3.2% of the
total CPU power while the average usage of the lowest video quality was as high
as 7.0±2.5%. This result indicates the feasibility of running scientific applications
on a modern web browser as the impact of executing this particular workload is
comparable to watching a video on Youtube.
3.5.2 Client NaCl Performance
We implemented an additional OS version of the fish counting application in
C/C++ and OpenCV to run on the testing machine. The OS version used the
same algorithms and similar code that were used in the NaCl version. Similarly, a
pure Javascript version of the application using a Javascript library for object de-
tection [4] was also implemented. The Javascript library was a port of the OpenCV
Haar Feature-based Cascade Classifier algorithm [99] employed in the OS and NaCl
version. To make sure that our experimental results were comparable, we used the
same classifier object and image data set on all runs. The NaCl and Javascript
fish counting application running on Google Chrome was benchmarked to compare
with the performance of the OS one. The three versions were run 100 times to
count fish on different input sizes varying from 25 to 100 images incrementing each
run by 25. The time it took for each run to count all the fish in the images (e.g
25, 50, 75 etc.) was recorded.
Figure 3.9 shows the performance of the NaCl version compared to the other
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two. The result shows that the NaCl implementation of the fish counting appli-
cation runs only 68% slower than the native OS version. Comparing this to the
Javascript implementation which runs about 11-12 times slower than the OS ver-
sion, the performance of the NaCl application is extremely fast. This is also a
signficant improvement over the fastest benchmark of Javascript which runs about
200% slower than native performance [5].
3.5.3 Server Performance
The server hosting reBOINC used a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon quadcore processor, 24Gb
of memory with Red Hat Enterprise v5.10 on a 2.6.18 kernel. We set up client
scripts to force the server to issue 1000 useful computations, to verify subsequent
answers, and to stream workloads from and submit results to a BOINC server.
The time it took for the server to handle each request type was recorded and the
amount of memory consumed was measured using the XDebug extension of PHP.
We benchmarked two different memory usages, a peak memory which described
the maximum amount of memory reBOINC consumed at that measured time, and
a mean memory usage. Table 3.1 shows average latency, peak memory and mean
memory usage of four different types of requests the reBOINC server handles.
The results show that verifying answers, streaming workloads from and submit-
ting results to the BOINC server is very fast with little impact on the server’s mem-
ory. In contrast, constructing a new useful proof-of-work challenge takes longer
and consumes more memory. While an average latency of 500ms per new useful
proof-of-work is undesirable for a fast, real-time web application, it is more tolera-
ble for reBOINC since such computations are infrequently issued. The request for
new useful proof-of-work occurs rarely at creation and account recoveries. Thus,
most of the requests handled by the server are for verifying answers which runs
relatively fast.
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3.6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In its current state, reBOINC has several limitations. While it has been shown
that a large, fixed, up-front cost to account creation can make the economics of
certain spammer strategies untenable [51], in an ideal situation, one would like to
give the adversarial account setups a much larger computation to perform com-
pared to legitimate account setups [68]. This is especially the case when the ad-
versary’s resources are extensive [67]. Unfortunately, there often isn’t sufficient
information to tell the two apart. To address this challenge, we are looking to aug-
ment reBOINC by leveraging MetaCAPTCHA’s legacy metrics such as geographic
information, IP and network address blacklists to determine the per-account com-
putation a client must perform.
In addition, while we have considered a simplistic use model, we aim to explore
new modes of applying useful puzzles in which the amount of work performed de-
termines the account capabilities given to clients. For example, a user who wants
to join a web forum and immediately post an unmoderated message might be
forced to compute all of the computational credit up front. However, a user who
doesn’t mind posts being temporarily moderated could be allowed to join with
smaller up front computation. This particular user could then complete the neces-
sary computation in the background to be granted unmoderated access. Similarly,
upon initial account setup, a user could only be allowed to post messages in a ”col-
lapsed mode”, while they perform the useful computations in the background. The
posts would then be automatically promoted upon successful creation of sufficient
computational credit.
Another issue with reBOINC is that it is difficult to ensure consistent user
experience across multiple web clients. For example, a client with a fast machine
will be able to complete the computations without any glitches while a slower one
will take longer and might introduce lags to the browsers. The system needs to
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make sure that the performance of the issued computations it is running is not
too intensive to create lags as well as not too easy allowing the adversaries to
process the computations in batch. Furthermore, different scientific computations
have different computational requirements. For instance, an image detection algo-
rithm will consume mostly CPU and GPU powers of the client machine while a
data mining application uses significant amount of virtual memory. To cover such
cases, the system can adjust the performance of the applications by (1) bench-
marking the scientific software on an average machine before publishing the work;
(2) benchmarking the client hardware before receiving work from the server; (3)
and monitoring client performance at real-time to reduce glitches. In addition,
these benchmarks need to employ security techniques to prevent the adversaries
from faking themselves as very weak machines in order to receive only easy work.
Finally, the accessibility of reBOINC is limited since only Google Chrome and
Chromium browsers support native code execution. Furthermore, Chrome requires
NaCL applications to be distributed through Chrome Webstore otherwise the NaCl
module will not be enabled. Future directions include support for Asm.js and
PNaCl. Asm.js is an open-source technology supported by both Firefox and Google
Chrome to allow languages such as C/C++ and Java to be compiled into a strict
subset of Javascript. This strict subset adds additional optimizations which enable
Javascript to run at near native speed. PNaCl is a portable version of NaCl, this
version allows NaCl applications to run on Chrome without the need to distribute
them through the webstore.
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RELATED WORK
CAPTCHA
The term CAPTCHA is proposed by Blum et al. [25] for interactive tests that
can distinguish humans and computers apart. CAPTCHAs come in many shapes
and forms. The most common type is textural CAPTCHA which requires users
to identify distorted and degraded texts [101, 82, 100, 30, 31, 84, 47, 33]. A
different type of CAPTCHA is the image-based one where users are required to
identify content or characteristics of an image such as orientation [53, 54], flipped
vs. non-flipped [24], dog vs. cat [14], labels of images [36], face recognition [73].
Audio-based is another kind of CAPTCHA that usually requires users to identify
words in a noisy environment [29, 89], this CAPTCHA is especially helpful for the
visually impaired people. However, CAPTCHAs are not always fun to solve, so
systems like Mollom [74] selectively issue them to only those users that appear to
be posting spam.
Proof-of-work
Dwork and Naor first introduced the concept of a pricing function (also known as
proof-of-work or client puzzle) to combat email spam. A prominent proof-of-work
system that discourage spam includes Hashcash, a system that requires senders
to attach “postage” to e-mail [23]. The postage is a partial hash collision on a
string derived from the recipient’s email address. Another proof-of-work solution
for throttling email spam was presented by Zhong et al. [111]. However, unlike
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Hashcash, their system based puzzle difficulty on the “spamminess” of the message.
Kaiser and Feng [62], Feng and Kaiser [46], Kaiser and Feng [63] proposed kaPoW,
a reputation-based proof-of-work system to discourage spam in webmail and ticket
selling web applications. There have also been proposals to put proof-of-work
to good use. MetaCAPTCHA incorporates the features of above proof-of-work
systems while augmenting them with a generic puzzle issuing mechanism and a
comprehensive reputation service.
Useful Proof-of-work
The idea of useful proof-of-work was first proposed by Jakobsson and Juels [60].
The idea is that a computational effort invested in solving the proof can be reused
for a meaningful purpose. Diament et al. [39], Zhang et al. [110] revised the useful
proof-of-work construction to offload the computations of the servers to the client
side as countermeasures against denial-of-service attacks. These systems require
the clients to execute specific workloads of the server in order to gain access to the
service. This robust construction prevents the server resources from depleting and
at the same time benefits the system with additional computing power. Similarly,
da Costa Cordeiro et al. [35] developed a model for using useful puzzles for identity
management and prevention of Sybil attacks in distributed systems.
Bitcoin can be regarded as useful proof-of-work system even though the sys-
tem heavily depends on cryptographic functions. In a Bitcoin system, each user
contributes to computations whose result can be reused as digital currency [79].
The system allows the users to find a nonce that when hashed with the network’s
block header will satisfy a particular condition. When found, the result will be
populated through the network to prevent double-spending and therefore obtain
their monetary value. In similar fashion, reCAPTCHA [101] is a spam prevention
service where the result of solving the CAPTCHAs helps digitizing books. The
service uses text-based interactive puzzles where a user has to correctly enter the
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characters presented in an image. By combining a known and unknown text in
the images, the puzzle uses the result submitted by the users to interpret scanned
manuscripts.
Outsourced Computations on the Web Browsers
Outsourced computation is not a new topic; however, its advancement on browsers
has been very limited due to the fast-paced, per-request characteristic of the web.
Karame et al. [65] offered a unique model to this problem by executing outsourced
computations on the browser as micropayments for web applications. This model
is web-friendly since it enables the users to read online newspapers for free while
their browsers are utilized to compute useful computations. In a different way,
researchers at the University of Washington are developing a system called Lind -
a secure, lightweight cloud computing environment using NaCl in the web browser
[6]. The system could allow the server to issue arbitrary computations to its clients
using the web browser as a computing platform. Another system called Gridbee
developed by researchers at BME IK has similar capabilities [12]. The system is
an adapted BOINC framework which supports scientific computations on the web
browsers using Javascript and NaCl applications.
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5
CONCLUSION
Spam is a perpetual problem that threatens the quality of content on the Internet.
However, existing spam fighting systems are not generic and practical enough to
be deployed on the web, plus their pricing functions are moderately fixed. As
such, these systems are often too simple allowing the spammers to study and
subvert them. Furthermore, current methods of proof-of-work spam throttling
systems are effective but are not sustainable since the computational power of the
users is wasted. While there is a large community that supports sustainable and
meaningful use of computational power such as volunteer computing, there is not
a system that leverages these characteristics to fight spam.
MetaCAPTHCA and reBOINC address these problems. MetaCAPTCHA seam-
lessly integrates the CAPTCHA and proof-of-work approaches while augmenting
each: it can dynamically issue proof-of-work or CAPTCHA puzzles while ensur-
ing that malicious users solve “harder“ puzzles than honest users. In addition,
the puzzles issued by MetaCAPTCHA are completely nondeterministic making it
difficult to be subverted. We evaluated MetaCAPTCHA in the context of a web
application and showed that 95% of honest users hardly noticed MetaCAPTCHA’s
presence, whereas the remaining 5% were required to solve very “easy” puzzles be-
fore accessing the application’s services. reBOINC tackles the problem of wasting
the computational resources of clients in the proof-of-work model. The reBOINC
system also demonstrates that in practice, the proof-of-work model can employ var-
ious kind of useful computations whose results help to solve the world’s demanding
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problems. Additionally, our evaluations have demonstrated that executing inten-
sive scientific calculations as proof-of-work in web browsers is feasible with modest
impact on the user-experience. To support this, reBOINC sets up a flexible struc-
ture so that new volunteer computing projects can plug into the network with
minimal modification to both parties including large applications that depend on
complex libraries such as OpenCV.
At a high-level, reBOINC and MetaCAPTCHA are a practical attempt to
build an infrastructure that connects the rapidly growing demand for computing
power needed by scientific research with the vast spammers supply of comput-
ing resources. As a result, the infrastructure can be part of a win-win scenario
where either the scientific communities have access to greater resources to solve
demanding problems or the web applications can reduce their spam load.
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